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I.

Introduction

In the stories U.S. legal scholars tell about themselves, the hero’s
journey often involves revolt against the old order. The Legal Realists
overturned Langdell’s Formalism; the Critical Legal Studies movement
rejected the quietism of Legal Process Theory and exposed the limits of the
then dominant liberal rights discourse; Critical Race scholars, in turn, took
the Critical Legal Studies scholars down a notch; and coming from a very
different direction, early practitioners of Law and Economics uprooted
traditional, muddied understandings of the common law, replacing them
with clear-headed analysis of incentive effects and social welfare.
In The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore depicts Arthur Linton
Corbin as the hero of just such a story. Corbin was ‘a non-establishment
revolutionary,’ who set out to overturn the classical theory of contract built
by Christopher Columbus Langdell, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Samuel
Williston.1 On Gilmore’s reading, Corbin belongs to the vanguard of Legal
Realism, leading the charge against a doctrinaire, formalist and stultified
approach to the law of contracts.
Gilmore’s story does not fit all that we know about Corbin.2
Although Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn included Corbin on their list of
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Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This chapter benefitted
enormously from the comments of other authors in this volume, and from
conversations with William Twining and Guido Calabresi, each of whom shared
recollections of encounters with Corbin.
1
Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio St Univ Pr 1974) 60. Or more
fulsomely: ‘resituated in time, Corbin’s attack on the prevailing orthodoxy assumes
revolutionary proportions.’ Ibid 58. See also ibid 55-85. Gilmore had been a
student of Corbin, and Corbin recommended him to Robert Braucher for work on
the Second Restatement. Letter from Corbin to Robert Braucher (Nov. 2, 1959), in
Joseph M. Perillo, ‘Twelve Letters From Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher’ (1993)
50 Wash & Lee L Rev 755, 761.
2
Daniel Klau dismantles Gilmore’s telling of the relationship in a student note,
‘What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts’ (1990)
70 BU L Rev 511.
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Legal Realists,3 Corbin rejected the label, explaining in a letter to Llewellyn
that ‘[t[here are too many self-styled “Realists” whose eyes were opened
and yet saw nothing.’4 Nor was the relationship between Williston and
Corbin a battle between old guard and new. Corbin’s review of the first
edition of Williston’s treatise, though not uncritical, lauded its breadth and
attention to detail. Ten years later, Williston invited Corbin to work with
him on the first Restatement of the Law of Contracts, producing a work that
bears clear marks of each.5 At the time of Williston’s death, Corbin wrote
that Williston was to him ‘above all an affectionate and lovable elder
brother.’6
The stories Corbin told about himself were of a different type. In
them, the hero’s journey is not a fight against an earlier generation, but a
personal path from a search for legal certainty to a clearheaded
understanding of the law’s contingency, complexity and growth. It is the
story that Benjamin Cardozo tells in a passage from his 1921 Storrs Lecture,
which Corbin quotes several times in his writings.
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to
find how trackless was the ocean upon which I had embarked. I
sought for certainty, and I was oppressed and disheartened when I
found that the quest for it was futile. I was trying to reach land, the
solid land of fixed and settled rules, the paradise of a justice that
would declare itself by tokens plainer and more commanding than
its pale and glimmering reflections in my own vacillating mind and
conscience. I found, with the voyagers of Browning’s Paracelsus
that the real heaven was always beyond. As the years have gone by,
and I have reflected more and more upon the nature of the judicial
process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I
have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the
3

Frank and Llewellyn listed Corbin ‘as figures of central stimulus in the new
ferment.’ Karl L. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism’ (1931) 44 Harv L Rev
1222, 1226 n 18.
4
Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Karl Llewellyn (Dec. 1, 1960), quoted in Laura
Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960 (UNC Pr 1986) 241 n 83.
5
Williston wrote of his work on the Restatement:
My greatest indebtedness was to Arthur Corbin. His mastery of the law of
contracts was only equalled [sic.] by his generosity in contributing his best
efforts to a work that for the most part would pass under another’s name.
He had moreover made a special study of terminology, and his keen eye
for ambiguities and inexactness of expression saved me in many slippery
places. His friendship and that of the Director [William Draper Lewis] and
Professor Thompson remain major benefits to me of my work with the
Institute. For a part of the Restatement of Contracts Arthur Corbin assumed
the position of reporter and I acted as one of the advisers.
Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography (Little Brown 1940) 312.
6
Arthur Linton Corbin, ‘Samuel Williston’ (1963) 76 Harv L Rev 1327, 1329.
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process in its highest reaches is not discovery but creation; and that
the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and fears, are part of the
travail of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of birth, in which
principles that have served their day expire, and new principles are
born.7
This is the hero’s journey of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. It is a journey
from darkness into light, from illusion to truth.
Nor is it a journey that that the hero takes alone. In The Republic
the Allegory appears as ‘an image of our nature in its education and want of
education.’8 Similarly for Corbin, the task of both legal education and legal
scholarship is not merely to transfer legal knowledge from teacher to
student or author to reader, but to disabuse the reader or student of a false
sense of certainty about the law and to enable them to see it instead as a
contingent, evolving institution, one that builds on generalizations from
past experience, but also must attend to the demands of a changing social
world.
This Socratic approach accounts for what is so distinctive about
Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of
Contract Law.9 The work seeks not only to instruct the reader in the law of
contract, but also on how to think about the law of contract and the
common law more generally. Like any common law treatise, Corbin on
Contracts synthesizes vast numbers of judicial decisions and stakes out and
defends distinctive positions on doctrinal questions. But when read as a
whole, the treatise provides not so much a unified theory of contract law—
though there are hints of one—as it does a theory of common law
adjudication and reasoning.

7

Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale Univ Pr 1921) 16667. One might wonder whether Cardozo lifted the metaphor from Corbin, who
wrote in 1914.
In law, as in other phases of life, we find ourselves swimming blindly in a
sea of particular instances, straining to make safe landing on the shore of
some absolute and unvarying rule. We have hundreds of approximations
to such rule; but let us not deceive ourselves into thinking that our doctors
of law have reached that firm foundation, any more than have our doctors
of divinity or doctors of science.
Arthur L. Corbin, ‘The Law and The Judges’ (1914) 3 Yale Rev NS 234, 237.
8
Plato, The Republic (Allan Bloom tr, Basic Books 1968) 514a.
9
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working
Rules of Contract Law (2d ed, West 1963).
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II.

Biography

Arthur Linton Corbin was born on a Kansas farm in 1874, as he
observed, ‘only nine years after the death of Abraham Lincoln.’10 He died in
New Haven, Connecticut in 1967, the year of the Summer of Love and two
years before Neil Armstrong stepped on the Moon.
Corbin’s grandmother immigrated from Connecticut to Kansas in
1857. The family was part of the Kansas free state, antislavery movement,
and were friends with the abolitionist, John Brown. Corbin’s father, Myron,
took part in actions led by Brown, then fought in the Civil War as a member
of the 12th Kansas Infantry Regiment. After the war, Myron married
Elizabeth Linton and worked the family farm in Linn County. Corbin’s
parents were committed to education; Corbin’s mother taught in the county
schools. When Corbin was fourteen, the family moved to Lawrence for the
sake of the children’s education. According to Fredrich Kessler, Corbin said
that he walked the 75-miles from Linn to Lawrence in bare feet.11
Corbin received his undergraduate degree from the University of
Kansas in 1894, taught high school in Kansas for three years, then in 1897
entered Yale Law School, graduating in two.12 Corbin had been encouraged
to come to Yale by his sister, Alberta, who was a PhD candidate there.13
After receiving his law degree, Corbin spent four years practicing law in the
small mining town of Cripple Creek, Colorado.14 In 1903 he returned to
Yale Law as its first full-time faculty member. In that role Corbin was
instrumental in transforming Yale from something like a trade school, in
which most of the faculty were practicing attorneys, into an academic
institution.15 Especially notable was Corbin’s role in the hiring of Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld and Walter Wheeler Cook as professors, and the
appointment of Thomas Swan as Dean.16 Between 1923 and 1932, Corbin
worked closely with Samuel Williston on the American Law Institute’s
Restatement of the Law of Contracts. Although the project involved the
work of a larger committee, Williston wrote that his greatest indebtedness
in the project was to Corbin,17 and Corbin is listed as Reporter for the
chapter on Remedies.18 Corbin remained a member of the Yale Law faculty
until his compulsory retirement in 1943, at age 68. He published the first
10

Arthur L. Corbin, ‘Sixty-Eight Years at Law’ (1964) 13 U Kan L Rev 183, 183.
Robert H. Jerry, II, ‘Arthur L. Corbin: His Kansas Connection’ (1984) 32 Kansas
LR 753, 753-54.
12
Corbin, ‘Sixty-Eight Years’ (n 10) 183-84.
13
Jerry (n 11) 758. Alberta later returned to Lawrence to teach German at the
University of Kansas, where she eventually became the dean of women. There is a
Corbin Hall on the campus named after her. Ibid.
14
Corbin, ‘Sixty-Eight Years’ (n 10) 185.
15
Ibid.
16
Fredrich Kessler, ‘Arthur Linton Corbin’ (1969) 78 Yale LJ 517, 518.
17
See n 5.
18
‘Introduction,’ Restatement of the Law of Contracts (ALI 1932) vii, x.
11
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edition of Corbin on Contracts seven years later in 1950, the second edition
in 1963, and continued to add substantive updates for several years after.
Starting in 1959, Corbin involved himself informally in the drafting of the
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts, commenting in letters to the
Reporter both on the project as a whole and on draft chapters.19 Corbin’s
influence on the Second Restatement, however, lay more in his vast body
of scholarship than in any suggestions he made in the process. Although
Corbin left behind a large number of published works, the Yale Law Library
has apparently lost his papers.20
III.

Teaching

Corbin’s scholarship grew out of his teaching. He did not engage
directly with the major theorists of his day, and late in life wrote, ‘To me,
Austin was merely a name,’ and ‘in my early teaching years I knew nothing
of Roscoe Pound except that he talked of “sociological jurisprudence.”’21 As
William Twining has observed, Corbin’s theory of law emerged not from
engagement with others’ theories, but from a felt need to address a practical
problem: the gap between the ‘primitive and barely articulated assumptions
of judges, practitioners, and laymen’ and the law’s actual operation,
particularly in judicial decisions.22 Corbin sought to bridge that gap first as a
teacher, and later in his scholarship.
When Corbin was a law student, he was taught using the so-called
Yale System, which employed textbooks, recitations, and lectures, and
which used cases only as illustrations.23 At the age of eighty five, Corbin
described his legal education at Yales as traditional, rote and ‘not too
arduous.’

19

See Perillo (n 1). According to the Yale Law Journal’s bibliography of Corbin’s
publications, Corbin sent to the American Law Institute a draft complete revision of
the first Restatement at the beginning of the process. ‘Bibliography of the Published
Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin’ (1964) 27 Yale LJ 311, 322-23. Corbin himself
reported that he spent ‘the better part of eighteen months in making [a] one-man
revision of practically the entire Restatement, including sections, commentary, and
illustrations.’ Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years’ (n 10) 187. Corbin’s draft has apparently
been lost. Perillo (n 1) 755.
20
Scott D. Gerber, ‘An Ivy League Mystery: The Lost Papers of Arthur Linton
Corbin’ (2002) 53 SC L Rev 605, 607 (2002). In response to an inquiry from the
Georgetown Law Library, the Yale Law Library confirmed in March 2021 that it still
has almost nothing from Corbin in its archives.
21
Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to William Twining (October 1965), quoted in
William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (2d ed, CUP 2012) 29 &
450 n 8.
22
Ibid 29.
23
Fredrick C. Hicks, Yale Law School: 1869-1894 (Yale Univ Pr 1937) 34.
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The reason . . . was that the teaching was chiefly by lecture and
textbook. In each course a few specially selected case reports were
added, but these were always chosen as illustrations of the ‘rules’
and principles that were handed out. These cases were always
excellent and interesting, but we were never required to study and
discuss a group of cases, to pass an immature judgment with respect
to conflicting decisions or inharmonious reasoning. In the cases that
we studied, the court’s decision was always ‘right.’ Ipse dixit.24
In the same biographical reflection, Corbin did not celebrate his own
accomplishments as a student. Although Robinson’s Elementary Law ‘was
indeed pretty dull reading, . . . we were docile enough and lazy enough to
be willing to be “told” the law.’25 Corbin was equally self-effacing about his
four years of practice in Cripple Creek. ‘Some of the pleadings I drew in my
few civil cases plainly exhibited my lack of training in the analysis of the
factual problems involved and in the construction and application of legal
“rules” and principles. Fortunately, most of my legal opponents were
equally incompetent.’26 One might guess that these comments are the false
modesty of a highly accomplished octogenarian. But reading Corbin
broadly gives one the sense that his humility was also a midwestern habit of
mind. In any case, Corbin clearly distinguished himself enough at Yale that,
after four years of non-elite practice in a backwater mining town, he was
invited to join the faculty.
Corbin reported that when he began teaching law, he found it
impossible to implement the Yale System. ‘Mere verbally repeated “rules”
created no excitement and aroused no interesting discussions.’27 Nor,
however, did he switch to the approach that Langdell had introduced at
Harvard thirty years earlier, which required students to derive fundamental
24

Corbin, ‘Sixty-Eight Years’ (n 10) 184.
Ibid. Robinson’s book is a summary Blackstone’s Commentaries. The author
explains his approach in the Preface:
Regarding this treatise as a manual for the use of students, the author has
adopted a style as didactic and concise as possible. Nearly every sentences
is intended to be an answer to a question, and to embody some maxim,
principle, or definition. Illustrations, as well as explanations, have
generally been omitted, the student having access to such aids in the textbooks to which he is consistently referred. Conjectures, and expressions of
private opinions, have also been scrupulously avoided, and the beaten
track of authority has been followed, as nearly as the author could himself
discern it.
William C. Robinson, Elementary Law (Little Brown 1882) vi.
26
Corbin, ‘Sixty-Eight Years’ (n 10) 185. Corbin was even more blunt in a letter to
Llewellyn: ‘the pleadings I drew in four years of practice were a scandal and a
crime.' Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Karl Llewellyn, 1 Dec. 1960, quoted in
Twining (n 21) 28.
27
Corbin, ‘Sixty-Eight Years’ (n 10) 185.
25
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legal principles from a highly curated collection of cases.28 Corbin instead
asked his students to grapple with the facts, reasons and doctrines
expressed in the cases, with the goal of disabusing them of a naïve sense of
legal certainty. ‘[The student] soon realizes the inadequacy of his basis for
an independent judgment and the extent of the labor that looms before him.
It is no wonder that after a few months the student is in a maze of
uncertainty.’29 In the process, the student and the instructor each ‘discovers
that his own basis for an independent judgment is inadequate, that it is true
that “no two cases are alike,” that the “rules” and “principles” laid down by
judges and by the text writers are variable and conflicting, and . . . that the
rules and principles are in a constant state of evolutionary change.’30 In
1908, Corbin formally recommended that the Yale faculty abandon the
Yale System and switch to the case method of teaching. By 1916 the
method was widely used at the school.31
Corbin’s critical approach in the classroom sought to turn his
students into not skeptics, but pragmatic empiricists. He wrote to Karl
Llewellyn that in the late 1920s he had to ‘fight for life as a law teacher’
when his students were falling under the sway of a group of young Realists
at Yale, ‘all three telling these beginners that there is “no law,” only
separate cases . . . and all three (however green behind the ears) telling it
with explosive, atomic power.’32 Throughout his career Corbin distanced
himself from both the skeptical and the reductionist strains of Legal
Realism, and especially the claim that judicial decisions were not guided by
rules and principles.33 The point of Corbin’s critical pedagogy was instead
to teach his students a modest empiricism:
Throughout my teaching career, my efforts were directed at
inducing and compelling my students to acquire a background and
a method of analysis that would enable them to form and to
maintain opinions and generalizations of their own. The judicial
opinions and the ‘great books’ of the past are an essential part of

28

See Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of
Contracts (1871) viii (‘Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with
constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what
constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business
of every earnest student of law.’).
29
Corbin, ‘Sixty-Eight Years’ (n 10) 185.
30
Ibid 186.
31
Thomas W. Swan, ‘Professor Arthur L. Corbin Creator of the Present-Day Yale
Law School’ (1964) 74 Yale LJ 207, 208.
32
Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Karly Llewellyn (Dec. 1, 1960), quoted in Kalman
(n. 4) 107.
33
See Kessler (n 16) 519 (describing Corbin’s relationship to the Realists at Yale).
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that background . . . are the base from which we take the next step
forward.34
Corbin sought to teach his students not only that the law was made not
discovered, but also that legal rules are best understood as defeasible
generalizations from past experience—working rules in a constantly
evolving social practice.
Corbin’s most famous student was Karl Llewellyn. Llewellyn entered
Yale Law School in 1915 and remained there during the First World War,
unable to fight with the US forces due to his participation early in the war
on the German side.35 The Yale Law student body was at the time about
half its normal size, and Llewellyn stood out among his peers. Corbin later
reported that he and Llewellyn ‘working hand-in-hand’ together wrote half
the comments and case notes in the 1918-19 Yale Law Journal, for which
Llewellyn served as Editor in Chief.36 This was the beginning of a friendship
that would last until Llewellyn’s death in 1962. Llewellyn and his wife Soia
Mentschikoff both called Corbin ‘Dad,’ and Corbin signed letters to
Llewellyn with the same.37 The friendship between Corbin and Llewellyn
was built on a sympathy of ideas, and no intellectual biography of
Llewellyn would be complete without a discussion of his relationship to
Corbin.38
In his farewell address to the Yale Law faculty, Corbin described
law professors as ‘the midwives who start the infant lawyer and jurist on his
way.’39 Corbin’s pedagogy was Socratic in the original sense of the term. In
the Theaetetus, Socrates elicits from his young interlocutor various
definitions of ‘knowledge,’ only to find each inadequate—‘all of which our
midwife’s skill pronounces to be mere wind eggs and not worth the
rearing.’40 Socrates’s goal was not to turn his students into skeptics or
Sophists. It was to instill in them a form of modesty, both with respect to

34

Arthur L. Corbin, ‘Principles of Law and their Evolution’ (1954) 64 Yale LJ 161,
162.
35
Twining (n 21) 95, 535-43.
36
Arthur L. Corbin, ‘A Tribute to Karly Llewellyn’ (1962) 71 Yale LJ 806, 806.
37
See eg Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher (Nov 2, 1959) in Perillo (n
1) 760, 764; Gerber (n 20) 629, 635.
38
See Twining (n 21) 95-97.
39
Arthur L. Corbin, ‘Farewell of Arthur Corbin to the Yale Law School Faculty’ in
Guido Calabresi, The Future of Law and Economics: Essays in Reform and
Recollection (2016) 173, 175. See Plato, Theaetetus 150b-151d (in which Socrates
compares his skills in teaching youth to that of a midwife). In the next sentence,
Corbin describes law professors as ‘the gadflies that sting judges into better action.’
See Plato, Apology, 30e-31a (in which Socrates compares himself to a gadfly on
Athens).
40
Plato, Theaetetus in The Collected Dialogues of Plato (F.M. Cornford tr, E.
Hamilton & H. Cairns eds, Pantheon 1961) 210b.
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their own knowledge and with respect to the nature and grounds of
knowledge.
Then supposing you should ever henceforth try to conceive afresh,
Theaetetus, if you succeed, your embryo thoughts will be the better
as a consequences of today’s scrutiny, and if you remain barren,
you will be gentler and more agreeable to your companions, having
the good sense not to fancy you know what you do not know.
I know of no evidence that Corbin read Plato deeply. But his farewell
reference to Socratic midwifery nicely captures his own pedagogy. One
finds a parallel approach in Corbin on Contracts.
IV.

Conceptual Analysis

If Corbin was sometimes mistaken for a Legal Realist, it is perhaps
because he was a modernist: an early twentieth-century thinker who did
not feel bound by traditional modes of legal argument and analysis, and
who sought for a new, clear-eyed approach to the law. The first step in that
approach was to diagnose various forms of confusion embedded in legal
language, and to develop a new, more transparent vocabulary.
Corbin was in this respect in step with his time. Starting at the
beginning of the twentieth century, Anglo-American philosophy took what
Richard Rorty described as a ‘linguistic turn,’ premised on ‘the view that
philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved)
either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the language
we presently use.’41 The goal was to escape the intellectual traps that our
everyday language lays for us, or as Wittgenstein put it, to show the fly the
way out of the fly bottle.42 In US legal scholarship, Felix S. Cohen described
the approach in his 1935 ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach.’ Invoking Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and other early analytic
philosophers, as well as the American Pragmatists, Cohen argued that legal
reasoning is too often misled by the ‘vivid fictions and metaphors of
traditional jurisprudence,’ whereas it should be attending to ‘the social
forces which mold the law and the social ideals by which the law is
judged.’43
Although Cohen provided one of the most vivid descriptions of the
new analytic approach, the founding document appeared some twenty-two
41

Richard M. Rorty, ‘Introduction: Metaphilosophical Difficulties’ in Richard M.
Rorty, Linguistic Philosophy, The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical
Method (1967) 1, 3.
42
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe tr, Pearson
1953) § 309.
43
Felix S. Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935)
35 Colum L Rev 809, 812.
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years earlier: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s 1913 ‘Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning.’44 Hohfeld’s analytic
schemas were not novel; he drew from a range of earlier theorists. But his
concise analysis of abstract legal concepts appeared at the right time and
place, and his conceptual schema was widely used and discussed in early
twentieth-century U.S. legal scholarship.
Corbin was an important early champion of Hohfeld and his system.
It was Corbin who recommended ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions’ for
publication in the Yale Law Journal,45 and it was Corbin who facilitated
bringing Hohfeld to Yale Law faculty. In 1919, a year after Hohfeld’s death
from the Spanish flu, Corbin published a short summary of Hohfeld’s
system for students,46 and he reprinted Hohfeld’s table of jural relations in
the introduction in his 1919 edition of Aniston.47 The next year, in an
address to the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools,
Corbin provided something like a deduction of Hohfeld’s jural relations,
together with a detailed defense against critics.48 Corbin reported later in
life that Williston asked him to assist him on the Restatement project
because Williston wanted to ensure that the work would be consistent with
Hohfeld’s analysis.49
Hohfeld’s system is purely analytic. It aims to identify basic legal
concepts, to use them to diagnose conceptual confusions, and to develop a
technical vocabulary that avoids such confusions going forward. The goal is
to clear the ground for substantive legal argument, not to provide the
materials for it. As Corbin put the point: ‘It solves no problem or social or
juristic policy, but it does much to define and clarify the issue that is in
dispute and thus enables the mind to concentrate on the interests and
policies that are involved, and increases the probability of sound
conclusion.’50 Although Corbin’s attraction to conceptual analysis predated
his first encounter with Hohfeld,51 Hohfeld’s work provided him a new,
44

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale LJ 16.
45
Arthur L. Corbin, ‘Forward’ in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Yale Univ Pr 1964) vii, vii.
46
Arthur L. Corbin, ‘Legal Analysis and Terminology’ (1919) 29 Yale LJ 163.
47
William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract with a Chapter on the Law of
Agency (3d Am ed, A.L. Corbin ed, Banks Law 1919) vi.
48
Arthur L. Corbin, ‘Terminology and Classification in Fundamental Jural Relations’
(1921) 4 Am L Sch Rev 607, reprinted with alterations in Arthur L. Corbin, ‘Jural
Relations and Their Classification (1921) 30 Yale LJ 226.
49
Corbin, ‘Forward’ (n 45) xii.
50
Ibid xi.
51
In the same year Hohfeld published ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions,’ Corbin
published Arthur L. Corbin, ‘Discharge of Contracts’ (1913) 22 Yale LJ 513. This
short article maps the logical space created by two distinctions: Thomas Holland’s
differentiation of primary from secondary obligations, Thomas Erskine Holland, The
Elements of Jurisprudence (10th ed, OUP 1906) 141-42, and the analytic difference
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powerful toolkit. Throughout his writings, Corbin deploys Hohfeld’s
categories to identify conceptual confusion and clarify legal questions. Two
examples illustrate: Corbin’s definition of ‘contract’ and Corbin’s approach
to the consideration doctrine.
In his 1910 article, ‘Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit,’ Corbin
advances a fairly standard definition of ‘contract’: ‘The great distinctive
feature of these transactions is the agreement of the parties, the mutual
assent, the meeting of the minds. This agreement is the origin of the
obligation attached by the law and called contractual.’52 Only seven years
later, and four years after Hohfeld published ‘Fundamental Legal
Conceptions,’ one finds Corbin rejecting substantive definitions of this type.
In ‘Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations’ (a
Hohfeldian title if there ever was one), Corbin instead distinguishes various
meanings that, depending on context, ‘contract’ might have.
The term contract has been used without much discrimination to
refer to three different things: (1) the series of operative acts of the
parties expressing their assent and resulting in new legal relations;
(2) the physical document executed by the parties as an operative
fact in itself and as the lasting evidence of their having performed
the necessary operative acts; (3) the relations resulting from the
operative acts, consisting of a right or right in personam and the
corresponding duties, accompanied by certain powers, privileges
and immunities.53
There are two things to note about this passage, which reappears only
slightly modified in Corbin on Contracts.54 First, the analysis is pure
Hohfeld. The list of jural relations under the third meaning of ‘contract’—
legal rights, duties, powers, privileges, immunities—is drawn directly from
the most famous section of ‘Fundamental Legal Relations.’ To understand
contract law, one must attend not only to duty to perform, but to the full
range of jural relations that pertain to contractual relationships—from the
power to make an offer to a party’s immunity against modifications without
between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent—between conditions on
the existence of an obligation and obligations that are conditional in structure.
Corbin’s article appeared in May 1913, Hohfeld’s in November.
52
Arthur Linton Corbin, ‘Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit’ (1910) 19 Yale LJ
221, 222. The definition is the first I find articulated in Corbin’s writings, and
recalls Anson’s: ‘Contract is that form of agreement which directly contemplates
and creates an obligation: the contractual obligation is that form of obligation that
springs from agreement.’ William R. Anson, Principles of the English Law of
Contract and of Agency in Its Relation to Contract (8th ed & 1st Am ed, E. Huffcut
ed, Banks & Bros 1896) 2.
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consent to the secondary duty to pay damages after breach. Corbin’s
distinction between the first and third meanings of ‘contract’ is equally
Hohfeldian, reprising the latter’s distinction between operative acts and the
legal relations to which they give rise.55 Hohfeld: ‘One moment [“contract”]
may mean the agreement of the parties; and then, with a rapid and
unexpected shift, the writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the
contractual obligation created by law as a result of the agreement.’56
Finally, Corbin’s description of contractual writings, the second meaning of
‘contract,’ incorporates Hohfeld’s distinction between operative facts,
which by themselves suffice to effect a legal change, and evidential facts,
which are legally relevant only insofar as they are evidence of other facts,
operative or evidential.57
The second thing to note about the definitions Corbin lists is that
they are, like Hohfeld’s categories, purely analytic. Corbin’s multipart
definition does not describe the acts that give rise to contracts, the types of
writings that memorialize those acts, or the jural relations they give rise to.
Instead it identifies the logical structure of any contractual transaction:
operative acts by the parties, sometimes including a writing, that produce a
change in their jural relations.
In his treatise, Corbin observes that courts and scholars commonly
provide more substantive definitions of ‘contract.’ Williston and the First
Restatement define ‘contract’ as a promise or a set of promises whose
breach gives rise to a legal remedy;58 Anson defines ‘contract’ as a legally
enforceable agreement (the definition Corbin had once advocated);59 and
the Uniform Commercial Code defines ‘contract’ as the total obligations
which result from such an agreement.60 Corbin identifies two problems with
such substantive definitions. First, they are incomplete. Each names an
operative fact—promise or agreement—that itself requires definition and
further description. Second and more seriously, substantive definitions tend
to import an ‘inarticulate major premise’ as to which acts should suffice to
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generate a contractual obligation.61 There is, however, no reason to expect
the rules governing formation to be so simple that they can be captured in a
single definition. ‘[T]o determine whether a “contract” has been made and
what are the resulting legal relations is a matter for the entire treatise, not
for an introductory chapter. Instead of simplicity and uniformity, we shall
find complexity and variation.’62 Substantive definitions might at times be
necessary to clarify how one is using a word. But they should never be
understood as more than ‘working definitions,’ to be revised as needed and
discarded when they cease to capture the rule. And at the outset, it is
preferable to define ‘contract’ in terms of its structural features—voluntary
acts effecting a change in the actors’ jural relations to one another—rather
than by the nature of those acts or the substance of the relations.
One encounters the same analytic approach in Corbin’s discussions
of consideration. In his 1920 review of Williston’s treatise, Corbin praises
Williston’s treatment of the doctrine. Williston does not posit a single
definition of ‘consideration,’ but canvasses the history of the doctrine,
proposes two separate definitions, one for unilateral contracts and one for
bilateral contracts, then discusses a number of exceptional cases, such as
agreements under seal, promissory estoppel, promises by a discharged
bankrupt, and a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations.63
Corbin considers this treatment admirable in that ‘[i]t shows clearly that in
fact the courts enforce many promises for which there was no agreed
equivalent given in exchange.’64 He draws, however, a distinctly nonWillistonian conclusion:
The complexity of the result and the many admissions that conflict
exists and that certain very large classes of cases must be regarded
as ‘exceptional’ indicate that in many twilight zones the court must
trust to instinct rather than to definition or ‘theory’ or ‘established
principle.’ The effect of this is that the doctrine of consideration (or
61
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its manifold substitutes) approaches the similarly nebulous doctrine
of causa in the Roman Law.65
In the end, Williston’s sensitivity to the diversity of situations and holdings
within the caselaw undermines his own attempt to provide simple
substantive definitions of ‘consideration.’
The chapter on consideration in Corbin on Contracts opens not with
a definition, but with a question: Is a definition of ‘consideration’
practicable.66 Corbin answers it by telling of his own journey through
caselaw. Reading through recent judicial opinions has left him
assured that the reasons for enforcing informal promises are many,
that the doctrine of consideration is many doctrines, that no
definition can rightly be set up as the one and only correct
definition, and that the law of contract is an evolutionary product
that has changed with the time and circumstances and that must
ever consider to so change.67
The only fixed, generic definition one can give of ‘consideration’ is
therefore empty and analytic. ‘[W]hen the statement is made that no
informal promise is to be enforceable if it is without consideration, it must
be understood as a statement that no informal promise is enforceable unless
it is accompanied by one of those factors that have been held, more or less
generally, to be sufficient to make a promise enforceable.’68 ‘Consideration,’
for Corbin, refers to whatever reasons the law recognizes for enforcing an
informal promise or agreement. Such a definition is pure tautology. But this
is how it should be. Substantive definitions risk producing legal arguments
that avoid the issue.
This is not to say that substantive definitions of legal terms are
always wrongheaded. Definition is not destiny, as Williston’s multi-layered
discussion of the consideration doctrine illustrates. Corbin does not
therefore fault Williston for adopting a substantive definition. ‘Having made
a choice and warned his readers thereof, with his reasons, he can be further
required only to be consistent.’69 But Williston’s attachment to first
principles tends to lead his own analysis astray. Substantive definitions are
problematic when one seeks in them answers to hard legal questions.
Corbin finds an example in Williston’s early treatment of an
offeror’s power to revoke. The issue is a familiar one: when an offeree can
accept by performance only, empowering the offeror to revoke right up to
the completion of performance—right up to the moment acceptance
65
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happens—risks unfairness. The offeree might accomplish almost everything
requested, and then due to a revocation receive nothing return. Williston
admits the ‘obvious injustice’ of such an outcome,70 but argues that the
consideration requirement demands it. ‘[A]ny other result involves either a
violation of recognized principles of contract, or the invention of new
ones,’ for the offeror cannot be ‘bound by a promise for which he has not
received, and may never receive, the consideration requested.’71
In his 1920 review, Corbin provides a two responses. First, Corbin
deploys Hohfeld’s categories to diagnose a confusion in the argument. The
offeror who cannot revoke his offer is not yet under a duty. Irrevocability is
not a duty but a disability: the offeror does not have the power to extinguish
the offeree’s power of acceptance.72 The duty to perform comes into
existence only if and when the offer is accepted. If consideration is the sina
qua non of contractual duties, a rule that the beginning of acceptance by
performance renders the offer irrevocable does not violate the consideration
doctrine.
But proper classification does not of itself resolve the question.
Corbin’s second response is that the existing doctrine of consideration is not
a straightjacket. If irrevocability upon the beginning of an acceptance by
performance requires the invention of new principles, courts should invent
them. ‘The history of the law consists chiefly in the destruction and
modification of old theory by new practice.’73 Here Corbin was prescient.
Section 45 the first Restatement provides that the beginning of acceptance
by performance binds the offeror to perform conditional on completion of
performance.74 The comments identify two independent grounds: part
performance provides sufficient consideration for a subsidiary, implied
promise not to revoke, and the offeree’s justifiable reliance can suffice to
make the offer binding.75
For Corbin, substantive definitions of legal terms should be treated
always as ‘working definitions,’ and statements of legal rules as ‘working
rules,’ subject to revision and possible rejection based on new evidence,
experience and examples. This explains why Corbin could sign on to the
first Restatement’s treatment of the consideration doctrine. The Restatement
provides a simple, substantive definition of ‘consideration,’76 but then goes
on to identify a long list of exceptions to the consideration requirement.77
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Whether one defines ‘consideration’ narrowly and then allows exceptions
to the requirement, or broadly as anything facts that support legal
enforcement, they key is to remain open to the many grounds for
enforcement at work in contract law.78
V.

Theory of the Common Law

If analytic clarity is for Corbin the path out of the Cave, it is not the
end of the journey. ‘Rules of law are not constructed by mere analysis and
mere logic.’79 Conceptual analysis tells us neither what the law is nor what
it should be. The Legal Realists who addressed those questions tended
either to fall into rule skepticism, typified in the quip that a judge’s decision
can often be explained by what they ate for breakfast,80 or to fall back on
one or another of the emergent social sciences.81 Corbin, in distinction,
seeks to reconstruct and defend a distinctive form of common law judicial
reasoning, one that both recognizes the law’s contingency and affirms its
rational basis.
Having thus been freed from illusion and delusion, the study most
be continued until it demonstrates that useful working rules and
definitions can be found and stated; that such rules and definitions,
if well constructed, are useful guides to justice even though they are
not absolute and eternal.82
In Corbin’s farewell letter to the Yale Law Faculty, written when he was still
in the middle of writing the first edition of his treatise, Corbin defends the
modesty of this approach.
I believe that there is greater hope, of human welfare and
happiness, if we are conscious of our limitations, if we abandon the
quest for absolutes, if we confess that justice is wholly relative and
human, and if we erect our temple of peace upon a foundation,
made as stable as we can by a neat balancing of interests,
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determined by as careful and complete a study of human
experience as possible.83
The core idea reappears in the subtitle Corbin chose for his magnum opus:
A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law.
Corbin’s theory of the common law can be restated in five
interlocking claims: the work of the common law judge is empirical; sound
judicial judgment draws from multiple sources; the law should, and
generally does, reflect existing social values or mores; because social
structures and mores change over time, the law too must evolve;
consequently, legal rules and principles should be understood to be
‘working rules,’ subject to revision and even wholesale rejection should the
need arise.
For Corbin, common law judicial reasoning is not deduction from
facts and rules to case outcomes. Precedent and principle do not
sufficiently constrain judicial decision-making for that to be so. ‘[H]owever
“well-settled” the rules may be, their application to life is always uncertain.
. . . In all cases the judge must construct his own major premise.’84 The
judicial process requires instead a form of inductive reasoning, one that
begins with the facts and decisions of past cases and ends with a judgment
as to the best resolution of the case at bar. In 1954, Corbin told a story
about a lunch he had around 1920 with some of the young Legal Realists
on the Yale faculty. When they posed the question, ‘Do you think there is
such a thing as a legal principle?’, Corbin allowed that legal principles are
not things ‘handed down from on high,’ but maintained
that there are useful generalizations based on long human
experience; that although no two cases are ever exactly alike, there
are groups of cases that have much in common; that by careful and
imaginative analysis and comparison of these cases it is possible to
construct general rules, doctrines, principles, which are of great
value in directing and predicting future human and judicial action
in similar cases.85
The idea of ‘imaginative analysis’ is key. Judicial empiricism, for Corbin, is
not mere scientific induction. It does not count past factual scenarios, ratios
decidendi and case outcomes so as to project a rule into the future.86 It is
83
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instead the imaginative projection of a proposed ruling onto past facts and
decisions, as well as future cases, as a means of testing ruling and the rule
in a wide range of instances against the balance of reasons and the
judgments of oneself and others.
To say that judging is an inductive process using imaginative
projection is not yet to provide an account of how judges do or should
decide cases or establish rules. It is here that one finds Corbin’s pluralism.
The sources of individual judicial decisions are, and should be, manifold.
The rules come from all possible sources—from constitutions and
statutes; from the decisions of other judges; from legal writers,
ancient and modern, in this and in other countries; from books of
religion and morality; from the general principles of right and wrong
in which the judge was trained from his youth up; from the rules of
action customarily followed in the community, lately referred to by
Lord Chancellor Haldane as Sittlichkeit; from the judge’s own
practice and interest and desire. The judge, if honest, lays down
either a rule that has been approved or acquiesced in by the
community in the past, or a rule to which he believes the
community will in the future give approval and acquiescence.87
Pluralism of this type entails a high degree judicial discretion. No matter
how much a judge claims that the law compels the result in a case, in fact
the judge always has a choice in both outcome and result. If established
legal rules are manipulable and the sources of judicial judgment are
multiple, then there is no one correct outcome to the novel case.
The check on judicial decisions, for Corbin, lies not in the existing
law or the principles that organize it, but in the broader community’s sense
of justice. Although though the individual judicial decision has multiple
sources, one among them provides the ultimate criterion of correctness:
Sittlichkeit, or social mores. Here one sees the influence of the Yale
sociologist William Graham Sumner and Sumner’s student Albert Galloway
Keller on Corbin’s thinking.88 And although Corbin reported he was
the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer
Contracts’ (2017) 84 U Chi L Rev 7. I critically examine that approach in Gregory
Klass, ‘Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract
Law’ (2019) 36 Yale J Reg 45.
87
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unfamiliar with Roscoe Pounds work when he began teaching,89 one also
hears echoes of Pound’s 1907 call for a sociological jurisprudence: ‘In all
cases of divergence between the standard of the common law and the
standard of the public, it goes without saying that the latter will prevail in
the end. Sooner or later what public opinion demands will be recognized
and enforced by the courts.’90 Like Pound, Corbin posits that
correspondence between law and social mores is both desirable and
inevitable. The law should be an expression of community values, and a
legal rule that offends community values will not endure. If the judge
‘constructs and applies rule that is in conflict with the interests and desires
and customs of the many, . . . [t]he man-mountain will quake, and the
house of logic that the judge built will come tumbling about his ears.’91
As the conditions of social life and social values change over time,
the law therefore should and will evolve with them. Here the common
law’s particularistic approach is of special value. Legal reform should not
be outsourced to economists, sociologists, moral philosophers or other high
theorists. ‘Ardent reformers and confident legislators often believe that they
are wise enough to generalize for the future; but experience indicates that
the best way to turn mores into law is to do it piecemeal by the “molecular
motion” of the courts.’92 The driving force behind progress in the law is not
theory or sweeping legislative change, but the hard case: the case in which
the existing legal rule is out of step with the community’s sense of justice.
‘When a stated rule of law works injustice in a particular case; that is,
would determine it contrary to the “settled conventions of the community,”
the rule is pretty certain either to be denied outright or to be undermined by
a fiction or a specious distinction.’93 As in natural evolution, the common
law achieves progress not by design, but by a process of variation and
selection.
Consequently, the law is at all times a mix of both the old and the
new. ‘There will always be two large fields of legal uncertainty—the field of
the obsolete and the dying, and the field of the new born and growing.’94
Here we return to Corbin’s insistence that legal rules be understood always
as mere working rules. ‘Those of lesser wisdom and more self-conceit will
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state their doctrines as absolutes and eternal. A law that is composed of
tentative, working rules is indeed a human law; but it is also a natural
law—it is as “natural” as rain, as “natural” as birth and death.’95
This understanding of the common law accounts for Corbin’s early
enthusiasm for the American Law Institute’s Restatement project. The
Restatements for Corbin were not attempts to identify the fundamental
principles of contract law, which would involve a return to a formalism, a
refusal to admit the variety and contingency of legal rules. They were
empirical undertakings. In 1929, while the committee was still working on
the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Corbin described the Restatements
project:
The work of the Institute is an attempt to state anew what the
practices and customs of this great and seething community now
are, as they are evidenced by innumerable instances of judicial
action at the pin-points of strain and conflict. It is an attempt to
demonstrate and to state in words the uniformities (the rules) that
are to be found in those innumerable instances and to make a
selection and a recommendation from among competing rules and
practices. It is an attempt to analyze and classify and define, at a
time when such reorganization work appears to be loudly
demanded, and thus supply a guiding hand to those who may desire
guidance in directing the strong arm of the state.96
The great advantage of the Restatement form lay in the fact that it was not
binding on courts. A civil code represents the final statement of an
authoritative body, freezing the law in place and inviting textual analysis
and argument from definition. Civil codes reify and stultify. Because a
Restatement is not binding, it should not ‘become the basis of extended
commentaries or the subject of textual interpretation.’97 Nor should it
‘operate to limit the development of the law in accordance with changing
conditions, practices, and mores.’98 Rather than a statement of fundamental
legal principles or rules, a properly formed Restatement contains a concise
depiction of the working rules at one stage of the law’s evolution, thereby
providing legal practitioners the materials they need for those rules’
refinement, modification and even possible rejection.
The major elements of Corbin’s theory of the common law appear
as early as his 1914 essay, ‘The Law and the Judges.’ Fifty years later, the
1964 Pocket Supplement to Corbin on Contracts summarized and
reaffirmed the same vision.
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A study of the appellate court decisions can never decrease in value
or interest, for the reason that they constitute the living evidence of
the continuing evolutionary process of our judicial system, both in
the statement of its ‘working rules,’ and as to its success or failure in
the administration of ‘justice.’ Such a study necessarily
demonstrates the possibility of constructing reasonably definite
‘working rules’ to serve as guides to the lawyer in giving advice to
his client and to the courts in reaching and justifying a decision.
These rules can never be absolute and eternal; as ‘guides’ they
cannot be infallible; but if well constructed they can be useful. At
the same time confusion and injustice are the sure result of the
uncritical repetition of verbal formulas handed down from the past.
A worded rule is of little value apart from the facts to which it is
applied; and the very existence of a ‘rule’ depends upon the sumtotal of its applications. With the expansion of population, the
changes in social, economic and physical conditions, and the
variations in the prevailing notions of men as to justice and morality
(the mores of the time), all ‘rules of law,’ constitutional, statutory
and judge-made, must likewise change. Certainty is an illusion, and
the illusion of certainty is the mother of injustice and turmoil.99
Corbin was not a philosopher. From his earliest writings to the last, he does
not make the case for the above theory of the common law so much as
pronounce it. And the theory is open to obvious criticisms. Although Corbin
acknowledges that individual judges often issue rulings based on confusion
or corruption, he assumes that the great judge has access both to the
wisdom embodied in past decisions and to the community’s present sense
of justice. And he largely ignores the role of wealth, class, race and politics
in determining who gets on the bench, which arguments make it into court,
and which legal rules are likely to survive. It is not that Corbin neglects
such factors entirely. The Preface to Corbin on Contracts allows that ‘[it]
cannot be said that the law operates uniformly with respect to the promises
of the rich and the poor, the employer and the employee.’100 But mostly
Corbin draws his picture of the common law cathedral from within. As
arguably befits a treatise author, Corbin takes the perspective of a cautious
believer. Although he was happy to knock down false idols, Corbin had no
desire to tear down the church.
VI.

Reasonable Expectations and Contract Interpretation

Corbin’s regular reflections on judicial practice, the nature of the
common law, and the relation of law to society are among the most
99
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distinctive features of Corbin on Contracts. In the Preface to the first edition,
Corbin acknowledges and explains his penchant for theorizing.
A general treatise on some one special branch of law, even though
that branch is as broad and inclusive as the law of contracts, may be
thought not to be the place for a discussion of general theories of
jurisprudence. But one who prepares a treatise on any branch of the
law cannot avoid applying theories of jurisprudence.101
That said, it would be negligent in a chapter devoted to Corbin not to pay a
bit more attention to what he had to say about the law of contracts. This
section discusses two aspects of Corbin’s approach to contract law: his
quiet attachment to a reliance theory contract and his account of contract
interpretation.
Fourteen years before Lon Fuller’s 1931 ‘The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages,’102 in an explanation of the objective approach to
contract interpretation, one finds Corbin asserting that the goal of contract
law is not to realize the probable intentions of the parties, but ‘to secure the
fulfilment of the promisee’s reasonable expectations as induced by the
promisor’s act.’103 Despite Corbin’s aversion to high theory, Corbin on
Contracts opens with an affirmation of the same thesis.
That portion of the field of law that is classified and described as the
law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations
that have been induced by the making of a promise. Doubtless this
is not the only purpose by which men have been motivated in
creating the law of contracts; but it is believed to be the main
underlying purpose, and it is believed that an understanding of
many of the existing rules and a determination of their effectiveness
require a lively consciousness of this underling purpose.104
It is this reasonable expectations thesis that Gilmore emphasizes in The
Death of Contract, arguing that Corbin was responsible for section 90 of the
first Restatement (recognizing promissory estoppel), thereby planting the
seed of reliance-based liability that would grow to destroy the exchange
theory of Holmes, Langdell and Williston. Although the story Gilmore tells
does not square with the evidence, it is notable that Corbin chose to open
his treatise with this broad assertion as to the underlying purpose of
contract law.
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Corbin does not treat the reasonable expectation thesis as a first
principle from which to deduce legal rules. Perhaps the most charitable
reading of it, given Corbin’s methodological commitments, is as an
empirical generalization, based on his reading of a vast number of judicial
decisions (although one finds him articulating the thesis as early as 1917).
But the thesis does play a substantive role in Corbin on Contracts,
occasionally clearly nudging the analysis in a particular direction. It shows
up, for example, in Corbin’s argument that consideration does not serve as
evidence of the parties’ intent to be bound, but is ‘evidence that the
expectation of performance was reasonable and that refusal to enforce
would not satisfy the community.’105 And Corbin devotes an entire chapter
to ‘Reliance on a Promise as Ground for Enforcement.’106 The thesis also
plays a central role in Corbin’s highly influential account of contract
interpretation.
Corbin’s understanding of interpretation bear’s the mark of Hohfeld.
To interpret the meaning of parties’ words and actions is to determine the
character of an operative act, an act that effects a legal change.
Interpretation does not specify the act’s legal effects: the resulting change in
the parties’ legal duties and other jural relations. For that we require a
separate rule. Corbin translates this Hohfeldian point into Francis Lieber’s
distinction between interpretation and construction. As Corbin expressed
the distinction:
By ‘interpretation of language’ we determine what ideas that
language induces in other persons. By ‘construction of the contract,’
as the term will be used here, we determine its legal operation—its
effect upon the action of courts and administrative officials. If we
make this distinction, then the construction of a contract starts with
the interpretation of its language but does not end with it; while the
process of interpretation stops wholly short of a determination of the
legal relations of the parties.107
Interpretation, whether done by a judge or a jury, is on this understanding a
purely factual inquiry, one that precedes and provides the materials for
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determining of the parties’ legal relations according to one or more rules of
construction.108
Corbin’s account of the nature of contract interpretation is shaped
by two further claims. The first concerns the nature of meaning and its
relation to context, and can be found in one of the best known passages in
Corbin on Contracts.
[I]t can hardly be insisted on too often or too vigorously that
language at its best is always a defective and uncertain instrument,
that words do not define themselves, that terms and sentences in a
contract, a deed, or a will do not apply themselves to external
objects and performances, that the meaning of such terms and
sentences consists of the ideas that they induce in the mind of some
individual person who uses or hears or reads them, and that seldom
in a litigated case do the words of a contract convey one identical
meaning to two contracting parties or to third persons. Therefore, it
is invariably necessary, before a court can give any meaning to the
words of a contract and can select one meaning rather than other
possible ones as the basis for the determination of rights and other
legal effects, that extrinsic evidence shall be heard to make the court
aware of the ‘surrounding circumstances,’ including the persons,
objects, and events to which the words can be applied and which
caused the words to be used.109
Corbin was no philosopher of language, and the above passage suggests a
relatively naïve conception of meaning: that the meaning of words are
sentences ‘consist of the ideas they induce in the mind,’ be it the mind of a
speaker, hearer, reader or someone else. One can, of course, define
‘meaning’ however one wishes. And perhaps this is how courts approach
interpretation in contracts cases. But few if any philosophers would agree
with the above as a general account of meaning. There are many ways to
interpret the meaning of a word, sentence or speech act that have nothing
to do with the ideas they elicit in a speaker, hearer or anyone else.110
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Still, this is the conception of meaning Corbin advances. And it has
two important implications for his theory of interpretation. First, context
always matters. ‘No language, however, fully and carefully “integrated,”
applies itself to the persons and objects and performances involved.’111
Because the ideas a speech act induces always depend in part on the
context, one cannot identify meaning (in Corbin’s sense) without
considering the circumstances of use. Second, the same words might
induce different ideas in separate occasions of their use, and might induce
different ideas in separate individuals on a single occasion of their use.
Consequently, words and speech acts commonly have multiple meanings,
any of which can legitimately be said to be their meaning.
Because a single speech act can have different meanings for
different persons, we need a rule to determine which meaning governs. ‘In
every case of interpretation, even though the contract is “integrated,” the
first question is: Whose meaning and understanding is it to which it is the
purpose of the law to give legal effect.’112 Unlike interpretation, this is a
legal question. If interpretation identifies the various meanings a speech act
has, we need a rule of construction to specify which of those meanings is
legally operative.
It is here that the reasonable expectation thesis makes an overt
appearance, marking the second pivotal moment. In the case of a will or a
sealed document on which no one has yet relied, it is the testator’s or
promisor’s meaning that governs. But that is not the rule of construction for
contractual agreements. When the parties to an agreement attach different
meanings to the words one or both use, one reasonable and the other
unreasonable, it is the reasonable meaning that governs. Corbin finds the
explanation for this rule in reasonable expectations thesis.
The foregoing result is reached because, as our system of contract
law has grown, one of its chief purposes is to secure the realization
of expectations reasonably induced by the expressions of
agreement, when this can be done without running counter to other
expectations and understandings that were also reasonably
induced.113
In short, the objective theory of interpretation, for Corbin, flows from the
reasonable expectation thesis. If A and B attach different meanings to their
agreement, A’s unreasonable and B’s reasonable, B’s must govern.
It is not the meaning that A gave; or the meaning that a normal user
of English would have given; or the meaning that the court may
hastily think is ‘plain and clear.’. . . [All these] are merely steps in
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the evidential search for B’s meaning and A’s reason to know it; no
one of them is the one that must prevail.114
Because the goal of contract law is to protect parties’ reasonable
expectations, the only meanings that matter are the ones that one or both
parties actually attached to their agreement.
Corbin maintains that the above holds true without regard to
whether the words at issue appear in an integrated writing. If the legally
salient meaning of words the ideas they induce in one or both parties, and
if those ideas always depend on context, then context is always relevant to
interpreting a writing. Williston had argued that when parties agree to an
integrated writing, they typically agree to be bound by the words’ plain
meaning, without regard to whether that meaning corresponds to their
individual understandings.115 Corbin rejects this account of integration. ‘It is
true that in such cases, the parties are found to have assented to the written
words as the definitive operative expression of their minds. This is an assent
to those words, not to any particular meaning of them.’116 Here again
Corbin recurs to principle: ‘A court exists for the purpose of doing justice to
the parties before it, and should not be misled into doing something else by
some third person’s definition of a word even though the contracting parties
both assented to a writing containing it.’117
Corbin’s influence on the Second Restatement sections on contract
interpretation is unmistakable. Section 202 provides as the first rule in aid
of interpretation that ‘[w]ords and other conduct are interpreted in the light
of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is
ascertainable it is given great weight.’118 The comments to sections 201 and
202 read as though they had been lifted directly from Corbin on Contracts.
‘Words are used as conventional symbols of mental states.’119 ‘[T]he context
of words and other conduct is seldom exactly the same for two different
people.’120 ‘The objective of interpretation in the general law of contracts is
to carry out the understanding of the parties rather than to impose
obligations on them contrary to their understanding.’121 ‘The meaning of
words and other symbols commonly depends on their context.’122 And
whereas the first Restatement suggested a separate rule for the interpretation
of integrated writings, the Second Restatement advocates a unified
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approach to all contractual communications.123 Again the explanatory
comment could have been written by Corbin. ‘It is sometimes said that
extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain meaning of a writing, but
meaning can almost never be plain except in context.’124
Viewed form the distance of several decades, Corbin’s approach to
contract interpretation exhibits from significant blind spots. One is Corbin’s
conception of the meaning as ‘the ideas that “contractual acts” induce in
the mind of some individual person who uses or hears or reads them.’125 I
have suggested that, given Corbin’s broader commitments, this claim is
most charitably read is as an empirical generalization regarding how courts
in fact interpret contractual agreements. But thousands of judicial decisions
have articulated and applied a different conception of meaning, embodied
in the so-called plain meaning rule. ‘[W]hen parties set down their
agreement in a clear, complete document, . . . [e]vidence outside the four
corners of the document as to what was really intended but unstated or
misstated is generally inadmissible to add to or vary the writing.’126 Plain
meaning, on this conception, is the meaning reasonably attached to the
words of a writing stripped of much of the evidence of the context
surrounding its original use.
Corbin’s response is to deny that language ever has a plain
meaning. ‘A study of many cases shows that however “plain and clear” may
be our chosen definition of the term “integrated,” its application to the facts
of any particular case may be very far from “plain and clear.”’127 But the
appellate case that make up the bulk of Corbin’s evidence hardly present a
representative sample. And Corbin’s claim about the inherent ambiguity of
language draws on his narrow definition of ‘meaning.’ The fact that words
in a writing can induce different ideas in different persons and in different
contexts does not entail that they do not have a conventional meaning
discoverable without that added context. To respond that that conventional
meaning does not count as ‘meaning’ in the relevant sense is to fall back on
precisely the sort of argument from definition that Corbin elsewhere rejects.
In addition to his narrow definition of meaning, Corbin’s account of
interpretation assumes a narrow conception of the act of contracting.
Corbin understands contractual agreements as, first and foremost,
agreements about what one or both shall do, to which the law happens to
attach legal effects, not as juristic acts, in which the parties decide for
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themselves what their legal relationship will be.128 One sees this naturalized
picture of contractual agreements in Corbin’s account of integration. The
parties’ agreement to integrate a writing is not, for Corbin, an agreement
that the writing will have a particular legal effect: that it shall serve as the
sole legal evidence of the terms contained in it. It simply an agreement that
all prior agreements shall by discharged or merged into the present one.129
This is why Corbin can so confidently claim that an integration is an assent
to the words in a writing, ‘not to any particular meaning of them.’130
Because integration is not a juristic act, there is no reason to think that the
parties understand their words in anything but their everyday meanings.
Accordingly, Corbin rarely if ever considers the impact that one or
another legal rule might have on parties’ understandings or behavior.
Contract interpretation should track parties’ everyday understandings and
expectations, not seek to shape them. But some parties contract in the law’s
shadow; their expectations and actions are shaped by the law. In such
transactions, it is by no means obvious that a party’s assent to the words in
an integrated writing is not also an assent to whatever meaning courts will
to give those words. This was precisely Williston’s point: when
sophisticated parties contract in a jurisdiction that employs a plain meaning
rule, each reasonably expects to be bound by the plain meaning of their
integrated writing—whether or not it corresponds to their individual
understandings. Sometimes assent to a writing might well be assent to a
meaning of the words in it that neither party holds.
Finally, Corbin never asks what rule of interpretation parties, at the
time of contracting, are likely to prefer. The role of courts in contracts
cases, on Corbin’s theory, is strictly backward looking: to protect the
parties’ reasonable expectations and do justice between them. It is not
obvious, however, that this is what parties want. Justice is often expensive,
and it can be difficult to predict what courts will consider a just outcome in
any given case. Parties might prefer to be bound by a meaning that is
cheaper to discover, easier to predict, and more difficult to manipulate—
even if it does not always correspond to their individual understandings.
In short, Corbin’s account of interpretation is premised on his claim
that the primary purpose of contract law is to protect parties’ reasonable
expectations. My own view is that the claim is not wrong, but incomplete.
Contract law additionally serves to enable exchange transactions between
parties who do not otherwise trust one another, to guide parties to efficient
and socially valued forms of interaction through default and mandatory
rules, and often to realize parties’ legal intentions.
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It is difficult to fault Corbin for failing to integrate these aspects of
contract law into his thinking. When Corbin on Contracts first appeared in
1950, the will theory, Langdell’s formalism, and Holmes’s dogmatic
division between law and morality were all within living memory. And it
was still ten years before the appearance of Ronald Coase’s ‘The Problem of
Social Cost’131 and the subsequent rise of law and economics. If arguments
from party incentives and expectations, from the value of predictability, and
from the minimization of litigation costs today seem obvious, it is because
legal scholars have now been applying economic analysis and game theory
to contractual transactions for more than fifty years. Corbin would not be
surprised by any of this, given his own understanding of the law as in a
constant state of flux. Corbin’s understanding of contract law was of its
time.
VII.

Conclusion

Although this chapter has focused on the broad strokes of Corbin’s
work, Corbin spent most of his time as a scholar attending to the fine lines
drawn in judicial opinions. The theory of the common law Corbin
published in 1914, after only ten years in the academy, is almost identical
to the ones he articulated in 1954 and in 1964.132 Having arrived early at
his own view of the common law, Corbin spent most of his scholarly life
deep in the caselaw and on the construction of his treatise. When Corbin
was in his 80s, he could still be found in the Yale Law Library reading room
poring over recent judicial opinions. Guido Calabresi, who was a student at
the time, reports the light there was so poor that Corbin would bring his
own reading lamp and, refusing offers of help from students, would crawl
under the table to plug it in himself.133 When William Twining went to
interview Corbin at his home nearly a decade later, Corbin had a box full of
index cards sitting next to his armchair. Then in his 90s, Corbin was still
taking notes on the appellate opinions for the supplements to his great
treatise.134 It was this passion for the actual, often messy work of courts,
combined with analytic clarity and a clear-eyed vision of the common
law’s evolutionary logic, that gives Corbin on Contracts its authority and
accounts for its enormous influence.
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